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Entrepreneurship and the Economic Theory of the Firm: 
Any Gains from Trade? 
 
 
 
Abstract:  Though they developed in isolation, the theory of entrepreneurship and the 
economic theory of the firm can be usefully integrated.  In particular, the concept of en-
trepreneurship as judgment associated with Knight (1921) and some Austrian school 
economists aligns naturally with the theory of the firm.  Because judgment cannot be 
purchased on the market, the entrepreneur needs a firm — a set of alienable assets he 
controls — to carry out his function.  We show how this notion of judgment illuminates 
key themes in the modern theory of the firm (existence, boundaries, and internal or-
ganization).  In our approach, resource uses are not data, but are created as entrepreneurs 
envision new ways of using assets to produce final goods.  The entrepreneur’s problem 
is aggravated by the fact that capital assets are heterogeneous. Asset ownership allows 
the entrepreneur to experiment with novel combinations of heterogeneous assets. The 
boundaries of the firm, as well as aspects of internal organization, may also be under-
stood as responses to entrepreneurial processes of experimentation.   
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Introduction 
Do entrepreneurs need business firms to carry out their function?  Are business firms 
run by entrepreneurs, or by hired managers?  Economists have been thinking and writ-
ing about entrepreneurship since at least the 18th century.  Within the last few decades, 
the theory of the firm has become one of the fastest growing areas in applied microeco-
nomics.  And yet, surprisingly, the above questions have rarely been asked.  The mod-
ern economic theory of the firm virtually ignores entrepreneurship, while the literature 
on entrepreneurship in economics and strategic management has limited use for the 
economic theory of the firm.1
This lack of contact between two fields that seem to overlap so naturally results 
partly from the development of economic thought.  The economic theory of the firm 
emerged and took shape as the entrepreneur was being banished from microeconomic 
analysis, first in the 1930s when the firm was subsumed into neoclassical price theory 
(O’Brien, 1984), and then in the 1980s as the theory of the firm was reformulated in the 
language of game theory and the economics of information.  The gradual “hardening” 
of the neoclassical approach in economics, including the mainstream approach to the 
theory of the firm, left, little room for the entrepreneurship; Baumol (1993b: 17) calls it 
“the specter which haunts economic models.”  In modern contributions to the theory of 
the firm (Williamson, 1975, 1985, 1996; Milgrom and Roberts, 1992; Hart, 1995) reference 
to entrepreneurship is passing at best.  These approaches are largely static and “closed,” 
meaning that they focus on solutions to given optimization problems, avoiding ques-
tions about the origin of the problem at hand, or indeed of the firm itself.  Agency the-
ory, for example, has generated important insights on the effects of incentives on effort 
and the relationship between incentive pay and risk.  In explaining how a principal gets 
an agent to do something, however, the theory overlooks the more fundamental ques-
tion of what the principal should want the agent to do, or indeed, how the principal got 
to be a principal in the first place (Foss and Foss, 2002). 
We argue that the theory of entrepreneurship and the theory of the firm can be 
usefully integrated.  We begin by surveying various approaches to entrepreneurship in 
the economics literature, asking to what extent the entrepreneur needs a firm (a set of 
alienable assets he controls) to carry out his function (“Does the Entrepreneur Need a 
Firm?”).  We conclude that only the concept of entrepreneurship as judgment has a direct 
and natural link to the theory of the firm.  Because judgment cannot be purchased on 
the market, the entrepreneur needs a firm — a set of alienable assets he controls — to 
carry out his function.   Next, we review briefly the main themes in the modern theory 
                                                 
1 The terms “entrepreneur” and “entrepreneurship” do not even appear in the indexes of leading texts on 
the economics of organization and management such as Brickley, Smith, and Zimmerman (2004) or Be-
sanko, Dranove, Shanley, and Schaefer (2004). Two British surveys of economics principles textbooks 
(Kent, 1989; Kent and Rushing, 1999) confirm a similar absence of the concept. 
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of the firm (existence, boundaries, and internal organization) and show how the notion 
of entrepreneurship as judgment illuminates these issues in novel ways (“Putting Entre-
preneurship into the Theory of the Firm: Judgment and Economic Organization”).  To develop 
a judgment-based approach to economic organization, we also draw on ideas from Aus-
trian economics (Mises, 1949; Kirzner, 1973; Salerno, 1993) — the body of economics 
that is perhaps most intimately connected to ideas on entrepreneurship — and on prop-
erty rights economics (Hart, 1995; Barzel, 1997), an important part of modern organiza-
tional economics.  In our approach, resource uses are not data, but are created as entre-
preneurs envision new ways of using assets to produce goods.  The entrepreneur’s deci-
sion problem is aggravated by the fact that capital assets are heterogeneous, and it is not 
immediately obvious how they should be combined. Asset ownership allows the entre-
preneur to experiment with novel combinations of heterogeneous assets.   
A number of unconventional insights emerge from this approach.  First, we ar-
gue that the existence of the firm may be understood in terms of limits to the market for 
judgments about how to combine heterogeneous assets to meet future wants.  Second, 
we argue that the boundaries of the firm, as well as aspects of internal organization, 
may be understood as responses to entrepreneurial processes of experimentation.  In 
this connection, we introduce a distinction between productive and destructive entre-
preneurship and argue that it is useful for understanding the internal organization of 
the firm.   
 
 
Does the Entrepreneur Need a Firm?  
The Firm and the Entrepreneur in Economics 
Because entrepreneurs in many ways personify market forces, one might expect 
them to be the central figures in economics. Similarly, because most entrepreneurial 
ventures somehow involve a firm, entrepreneurship in the context of firm organization 
would seem to be a central subject in the theory of markets.  While some classical 
economists, particularly Jean-Baptiste Say and Jeremy Bentham, reasoned this way, it is 
hardly characteristic of modern economics. 2  As the historian of economic thought Paul 
McNulty (1984: 240) puts it:  
The perfection of the concept of competition . . . which was at the heart of 
the development of economics as a science during the nineteenth and early 
                                                 
2 As Machovec (1995: 109) notes, to the classical economists “specialization and commercial freedom 
spawned opportunities for alert individuals.”  Unlike later economists, the classical economists held what 
is essentially a process view in which competition was seen “as a tapestry of aggressive commercial be-
haviors which created pure profits by speculating on price futures, engineering new methods of produc-
tion, and inspiring new product lines to better serve consumers” (ibid.: 136).  This is not true of Adam 
Smith, however; Schumpeter (1949: 65) writes that “the leading or directing activity as a distinctive func-
tion played a surprisingly small role in [Smith’s] analytic scheme of the economic process.”  
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twentieth centuries, led on the one hand to an increasingly rigorous analyti-
cal treatment of market processes and on the other hand to an increasingly 
passive role for the firm.  
The “increasingly rigorous analytical treatment” of markets, notably in the form 
of general equilibrium theory, not only made firms increasingly “passive,” it also made 
the model of the firm increasingly stylized and anonymous, doing away with those dy-
namic aspects of markets that are most closely related to entrepreneurship (O’Brien, 
1984).  In particular, the development of what came to be known as the “production 
function view” (Williamson, 1985; Langlois and Foss, 1999) — roughly, the firm as it is 
presented in intermediate microeconomics textbooks with its fully transparent produc-
tion possibility sets — was a deathblow to the theory of entrepreneurship in the context 
of firm organization.  If any firm can do what any other firm does (Demsetz, 1991), if all 
firms are always on their production possibility frontiers, and if firms always make op-
timal choices of input combinations and output levels, then there is no room for 
entrepreneurship.  
                                                
As this has been the dominant view of the firm in economics at least since the 
1930s, it is not surprising that much of the important work on the economics of entre-
preneurship was done prior to this period (e.g., Schumpeter), and that more recent 
work by economists on entrepreneurship has been done largely outside of the confines 
of mainstream economics (e.g., Kirzner).  However, as we argue later, advances in eco-
nomics over the last two to three decades have left economics somewhat better 
equipped to deal with entrepreneurship and to incorporate it into models of firm or-
ganization.   
Our approach below is to ask if the entrepreneur needs a firm, and if so, what it 
is that firm organization can do for entrepreneurs.  The answers are not obvious.  Some 
approaches to entrepreneurship — Schumpeter’s concept of the entrepreneur as innova-
tor, for instance — treat the entrepreneur as an uncaused cause, a pure genius who op-
erates outside the usual constraints imposed by resource owners and other market par-
ticipants and is thus unaffected by the firm.  Other approaches treat entrepreneurs as 
skilled managers, exercising their entrepreneurial talents through skillful arrangements 
of productive factors, thus being an integral part of the firm’s operation.3
Concepts of Entrepreneurship 
Entrepreneurship as management. In the entrepreneurship curriculum of many 
business schools, the phenomenon under investigation has often been “small-business 
management.”4  Entrepreneurs are pictured as the managers of small, family-owned 
businesses or start-up companies. Entrepreneurship consists of routine management 
 
3 On the history of the entrepreneurship concept in economic theory, see Elkjaer (1991) and Ibrahim and 
Vyakarnam (2003). 
4  However, this appears to be slowly changing towards a more generic and theoretically based under-
standing of entrepreneurship.  
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tasks, relationships with venture capitalists and other sources of external finance, prod-
uct development, marketing, and so on.  In this sense, entrepreneurship and the theory 
of the firm — the theory of some firms, at least — are inextricably linked.  The theory of 
entrepreneurship in this approach is the theory of how small business owners organize 
and manage their assets.  
Unfortunately, this notion of entrepreneurship is sufficiently elastic to be practi-
cally meaningless.  It appears to include virtually all aspects of small or new business 
management, while excluding the identical tasks when performed within a large or es-
tablished business.  Put differently, if entrepreneurship is simply a set of management 
activities, or any management activity that takes place with in a particular type of firm, 
then it is unclear why we should bother to add this label to those activities.   
Entrepreneurship as imagination or creativity. It is common, particularly within 
the management literature, to associate entrepreneurship with boldness, daring, imagi-
nation, or creativity (Begley and Boyd, 1987; Chandler and Jansen, 1992; Aldrich and 
Wiedenmayer, 1993; Hood and Young, 1993; Lumpkin and Dess, 1996).  These accounts 
emphasize the personal, psychological characteristics of the entrepreneur. Entrepre-
neurship, in this conception, is not a necessary component of all human decision-
making, but a specialized activity that some individuals are particularly well equipped 
to perform.5
If these characteristics are the essence of entrepreneurship, then entrepreneur-
ship has no obvious link to the theory of the firm (at least not without further argu-
ments).  The relevant personal characteristics can presumably be acquired by contract 
on the market by purchasing consulting services, project management, and the like.  A 
“non-entrepreneurial” owner or manager, in other words, can manage the day-to-day 
operations of the firm, purchasing entrepreneurial services on the market as needed.  
Moreover, the literature does not explain clearly whether imagination and creativity are 
necessary, sufficient, or incidental conditions for entrepreneurship.  Clearly the foun-
ders of many firms are imaginative and creative.  If not, are they not entrepreneurs? 
Entrepreneurship as innovation. Probably the best-known concept of entrepre-
neurship in economics is Joseph Schumpeter’s idea of the entrepreneur as innovator.  
Schumpeter’s entrepreneur introduces “new combinations”— new products, produc-
tion methods, markets, sources of supply, or industrial combinations — shaking the 
economy out of its previous equilibrium through a process Schumpeter termed “crea-
tive destruction.”  The entrepreneur-innovator is introduced in Schumpeter’s ground-
breaking Theory of Economic Development (1911) and developed further in his two-
volume work, Business Cycles (1939).  Realizing that the entrepreneur has no place in the 
                                                 
5 As Gartner (1988: 21) argues, however, this literature employs a host of different (and frequently) con-
tradictory notions of entrepreneurship. A “startling number of traits and characteristics have been attrib-
uted to the entrepreneur, and a ‘psychological profile’ of the entrepreneur assembled from these studies 
would portray someone larger than life, full of contradictions, and, conversely, someone so full of traits 
that (s)he would have to be a sort of generic ‘Everyman.’” 
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general-equilibrium system of Walras, whom Schumpeter greatly admired, Schumpeter 
gave the entrepreneur a role as the source of economic change.6  “[I]n capitalist reality 
as distinguished from its textbook picture, it is not [price] competition which counts but 
the competition from the new commodity, the new technology, the new source of sup-
ply, the new type of organization . . . competition which commands a decisive cost or 
quality advantage and which strikes not at the margins of profits and the outputs of 
existing firms but at their foundations and their very lives” (Schumpeter, 1942: 84). 
Schumpeter carefully distinguished the entrepreneur from the capitalist (and 
strongly criticized the neoclassical economists for confusing the two).  His entrepreneur 
need not own capital, or even work within the confines of a business firm at all.  While 
the entrepreneur could be a manager or owner of a firm, he is more likely to be an in-
dependent contractor or craftsman.  In Schumpeter’s conception, “people act as entre-
preneurs only when they actually carry out new combinations, and lose the character of 
entrepreneurs as soon as they have built up their business, after which they settle down 
to running it as other people run their businesses” (Ekelund and Hébert, 1990: 569). 
This suggests a rather tenuous relationship between the entrepreneur and the 
firm he owns, works for, or contracts with.  Entrepreneurship is exercised within the 
firm when new products, processes, or strategies are introduced, but not otherwise.  
The day-to-day operations of the firm need not involve entrepreneurship at all.  More-
over, because Schumpeterian entrepreneurship is sui generis, independent of its envi-
ronment, the nature and structure of the firm does not affect the level of entrepreneur-
ship.  Corporate R&D budgets, along with organizational structures that encourage 
managerial commitment to innovation (Hitt and Hoskisson, 1994), have little to do with 
Schumpeterian entrepreneurship per se.7  
Entrepreneurship as alertness or discovery. Entrepreneurship can also be con-
ceived as “alertness” to profit opportunities. While present in Cantillon’s and J. B. 
Clark’s notions of entrepreneurship, this concept has been elaborated most fully by Is-
rael Kirzner (1973, 1979, 1992). Kirzner follows Hayek (1968) in describing competition 
as a discovery process:  the source of entrepreneurial profit is superior foresight — the 
discovery of something (new products, cost-saving technology) unknown to other mar-
ket participants.  The simplest case is that of the arbitrageur, who discovers a discrep-
ancy in present prices that can be exploited for financial gain. In a more typical case, the 
entrepreneur is alert to a new product or a superior production process and steps in to 
fill this market gap before others. Success, in this view, comes not from following a 
                                                 
6 This includes, but is not limited to, the formation of new business ventures.  
7 Other writers influenced by Schumpeter, however, such as Baumol (1993a), do view public and private 
R&D, the scale and scope of patent protection, and basic science education as important determinants of 
the level of entrepreneurial activity.  
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well-specified maximization problem, but from having some knowledge or insight that 
no one else has — that is, from something beyond the given optimization framework.8
Kirzner’s entrepreneurs do not own capital; they need only be alert to profit op-
portunities.  Because they own no assets, they bear no uncertainty.  Critics have seized 
on this as a defect in Kirzner’s conception.  According to this criticism, mere alertness to 
a profit opportunity is not sufficient for earning profits. To reap financial gain, the en-
trepreneur must invest resources to realize the discovered profit opportunity.  “Entre-
preneurial ideas without money are mere parlor games until the money is obtained and 
committed to the projects” (Rothbard, 1985: 283).  Moreover, excepting the few cases 
where buying low and selling high are nearly instantaneous (say, electronic trading of 
currencies or commodity futures), even arbitrage transactions require some time to 
complete.  The selling price may fall before the arbitrageur has made his sale, and thus 
even the pure arbitrageur faces some probability of loss.  In Kirzner’s formulation, the 
worst that can happen to an entrepreneur is the failure to discover an existing profit 
opportunity.  Entrepreneurs either earn profits or break even, but it is unclear how they 
suffer losses. 
For these reasons, the link between Kirznerian entrepreneurship and the theory 
of the firm is weak.  Owners, managers, employees, and independent contractors can all 
be alert to new profit opportunities; Kirzner’s entrepreneur does not need a firm to ex-
ercise his function in the economy.   
Entrepreneurship as charismatic leadership.  Another strand of literature, incor-
porating insights from economics, psychology, and sociology and leaning heavily on 
Max Weber, associates entrepreneurship with charismatic leadership.  Entrepreneurs, in 
this view, specialize in communication — the ability to articulate a plan, a set of rules, 
or a broader vision, and impose it on others.  Casson (2000) calls these plans “mental 
models” of reality.  The successful entrepreneur excels at communicating these models 
to others, who come to share the entrepreneur’s vision (and become his followers).  
Such entrepreneurs are also typically optimistic, self-confident, and enthusiastic 
(though it is not clear whether these are necessary conditions). 
Witt (1998a, 1998b) describes entrepreneurship as “cognitive leadership.”  He 
outlines an entrepreneurial theory of the firm that combines recent literature on cogni-
tive psychology with Kirzner’s concept of alertness.  Entrepreneurs require complemen-
tary factors of production, he argues, which are coordinated within the firm.  For the 
firm to be successful, the entrepreneur must establish a tacit, shared framework of 
goals, which governs the relationships among members of the entrepreneur’s team.  As 
                                                 
8 Kirzner’s view of superior foresight differs from Stigler’s concept of search in which the value of new 
knowledge is known in advance, available to anyone willing to pay the relevant search costs. “Stigler's 
searcher decides how much time it is worth spending rummaging through dusty attics and untidy draw-
ers looking for a sketch which (the family recalls) Aunt Enid thought might be by Lautrec.  Kirzner’s en-
trepreneur enters a house and glances lazily at the pictures which have been hanging in the same place 
for years. ‘Isn't that a Lautrec on the wall?’” (Ricketts, 1987: 58). 
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Langlois (1998) points out, it is often easier (less costly) for individuals to commit to a 
specific individual, the leader, rather than an abstract set of complex rules governing 
the firm’s operations.  The appropriate exercise of charismatic authority, then, reduces 
coordination costs within organizations. 
A possible weakness of this approach, in our view, is its emphasis on human as-
sets, rather than the inalienable physical assets the entrepreneur controls.  Must the 
charismatic leader necessarily own physical capital, or can he be an employee or inde-
pendent contractor?  Formulating a business plan, communicating a “corporate cul-
ture,” and the like are clearly important dimensions of business leadership.  But are 
they attributes of the successful manager or the successful entrepreneur?   Even if top-
level managerial skill were the same as entrepreneurship, it is unclear why charismatic 
leadership should be regarded as more “entrepreneurial” than other, comparatively 
mundane managerial tasks such as structuring incentives, limiting opportunism, ad-
ministering rewards, and so on. 
Entrepreneurship as judgment.  An alternative to the foregoing accounts is that 
entrepreneurship consists of judgmental decision-making under conditions of uncer-
tainty.  Judgment refers primarily to business decision-making when the range of possible 
future outcomes, let alone the likelihood of individual outcomes, is generally unknown 
(what Knight [1921] terms uncertainty, rather than mere probabilistic risk).  This view 
finds expression in the earliest known discussion of entrepreneurship, that found in 
Richard Cantillon’s Essai sur la nature de commerce en géneral (1755). Cantillon argues that 
all market participants, with the exception of landowners and the nobility, can be classi-
fied as either entrepreneurs or wage earners:  
Entrepreneurs work for uncertain wages, so to speak, and all others for 
certain wages until they have them, although their functions and their 
rank are very disproportionate.  The General who has a salary, the Court-
ier who has a pension, and the Domestic who has wages, are in the latter 
class.  All the others are Entrepreneurs, whether they establish themselves 
with a capital to carry on their enterprise, or are Entrepreneurs of their 
own work without any capital, and they may be considered as living sub-
ject to uncertainty; even Beggars and Robbers are Entrepreneurs of this 
class (Cantillon, 1755: 54). 
Bearing risk—that is, making decisions under conditions of uncertainty—is the entre-
preneur’s raison d’être. 
Judgment is distinct from boldness, innovation, alertness, and leadership. Judg-
ment must be exercised in mundane circumstances, for ongoing operations as well as 
new ventures. While alertness tends to be passive (perhaps even hard to distinguish 
from luck [Demsetz, 1983]), judgment is active.  Entrepreneurs “are those who seek to 
profit by actively promoting adjustment to change.  They are not content to passively 
adjust their . . . activities to readily foreseeable changes or changes that have already 
occurred in their circumstances; rather, they regard change itself as an opportunity to 
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meliorate their own conditions and aggressively attempt to anticipate and exploit it” 
(Salerno, 1993: 123).  Those who specialize in judgmental decision-making may be dy-
namic, charismatic leaders, but they need not possess these traits.  Decision making un-
der uncertainty is entrepreneurial, whether it involves imagination, creativity, leader-
ship, and related factors or not. 9
Entrepreneurial Judgment as a Natural Complement to the Theory of the Firm 
While the view of entrepreneurship as judgment appears in many writers, it is 
most often associated with Knight (1921).  For Knight, firm organization, profit, and the 
entrepreneur are closely related.  In his view, these arise as an embodiment, a result, 
and a cause, respectively, of commercial experimentation (Demsetz, 1988).10   
Knight introduces the notion of judgment to link profit and the firm to the existence 
of uncertainty.  Judgment primarily refers to the process of businessmen forming esti-
mates of future events in situations in which there is no agreement or idea at all on prob-
abilities of occurrence.  Judgment is learned and tends to have a large tacit component.  
Entrepreneurship represents judgment that cannot be assessed in terms of its marginal 
product and which cannot, accordingly, be paid a wage.11  This is particularly because 
entrepreneurship is judgment about the most uncertain events, such as starting a new 
firm, defining a new market, and the like.  
In other words, there is no market for the judgment that entrepreneurs rely on, 
so exercising judgment requires the person with judgment to start a firm.  Judgment 
thus implies asset ownership, for judgmental decision-making is ultimately decision-
making about the employment of resources.  An entrepreneur without capital goods is, in 
Knight’s sense, no entrepreneur.12  This implies an obvious link with the theory of the 
                                                 
9 Mises (1949) introduces entrepreneurship to explain profit and loss. In the marginal productivity theory 
of distribution, laborers earn wages, capitalists earn interest, and owners of specific factors earn rents. 
Any excess (deficit) of a firm’s realized receipts over these factor payments constitutes profit (loss). Profit 
and loss, therefore, are returns to entrepreneurship. In a hypothetical equilibrium without uncertainty 
(what Mises calls the “evenly rotating economy”), capitalists would still earn interest, as a reward for 
lending, but there would be no profit or loss. 
10 Knight explains that “[w]ith uncertainty entirely absent, every individual being in possession of perfect 
knowledge, there would be no occasion for anything of the nature of responsible management or control of 
productive activities . . . Its existence in the world is a direct result of the fact of uncertainty” (1921: 267, 271).   
11  “The receipt of profit in a particular case may be argued to be the result of superior judgment. But it is 
judgment of judgment, especially one's own judgment, and in an individual case there is no way of tell-
ing good judgment from good luck and a succession of cases sufficient to evaluate the judgment or de-
termine its probable value transforms the profit into a wage. . . . If . . . capacities were known, the com-
pensation for exercising them can be competitively imputed and is a wage; only, in so far as they are un-
known or known only to the possessor himself, do they give rise to a profit” (Knight, 1921: 311). 
12 Carl Menger’s (1871) treatment of production gives the entrepreneur a similar role.  Production re-
quires an “act of will” and “supervision of the execution of the production plan.” These functions “entail 
property ownership and, therefore, mark the Mengerian entrepreneur as a capitalist–entrepreneur” 
(Salerno, 1998: 30). Menger describes “command of the services of capital” as a “necessary prerequisite” 
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firm, particularly those (transaction cost and property rights theories) that define asset 
ownership as a crucial ingredient of firm organization (Williamson, 1996; Hart, 1995).  
The firm, in this sense, is the entrepreneur and the alienable assets he owns, and there-
fore ultimately controls.  The theory of the firm is essentially a theory of how the entre-
preneur exercises his judgmental decision-making — what combinations of assets will 
he seek to acquire, what (proximate) decisions will he delegate to subordinates, how 
will he provide incentives and employ monitoring to see that his assets are used consis-
tently with his judgments, and so on.  
 
Putting Entrepreneurship into the Theory of the Firm:              
Judgment and Economic Organization 
At least some concepts of entrepreneurship, then, have implications for resource owner-
ship, and thus for the formation and organization of firms.  How, though, is entrepre-
neurship best incorporated into the theory of the firm?  What role might the entrepre-
neur play in various economic approaches to the firm? 
Established Theories of the Firm 
The neoclassical theory of the firm. As noted earlier, the neoclassical theory of 
the firm that forms the basis of competitive general equilibrium (and some game-
theoretic) models has no place for the entrepreneur.  In economics textbooks, the “firm” 
is a production function or production possibilities set, a “black box” that transforms 
inputs into outputs.  The firm is modeled as a single actor, facing a series of decisions 
that are portrayed as uncomplicated: what level of output to produce, how much of 
each factor to hire, and the like.  These “decisions,” of course, are not really decisions at 
all; they are trivial mathematical calculations, implicit in the underlying data.  In the 
long run, the firm may choose an optimal size and output mix, but even these are de-
termined by the characteristics of the production function (economies of scale, scope, 
and sequence).  In short: the firm is a set of cost curves, and the “theory of the firm” is a 
calculus problem.  There is nothing for an entrepreneur to do. 
While descriptively vacuous, the production-function approach has the appeal of 
analytical tractability along with its elegant parallel to neoclassical consumer theory 
(profit maximization is like utility maximization, isoquants are like indifference curves, 
and so on).  Nonetheless, many economists now see it as increasingly unsatisfactory, as 
unable to account for a variety of real-world business practices: vertical and lateral inte-
gration, mergers, geographic and product-line diversification, franchising, long-term 
                                                                                                                                                             
for economic activity. Even in large firms, although he may employ “several helpers,” the entrepreneur 
himself continues to bear uncertainty, perform economic calculation, and supervise production, even if 
these functions “are ultimately confined . . . to determining the allocation of portions of wealth to particu-
lar productive purposes only by general categories, and to selection and control of persons” (Menger, 
1871: 160–61).  
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commercial contracting, transfer pricing, research joint ventures, and many others.  The 
inadequacy of the traditional theory of the firm explains much of the recent interest in 
agency theory, transaction cost economics, the property-rights approach, and other 
theories spawned by Coase’s landmark 1937 article, “The Nature of the Firm.” 
The Coasian (contractual) framework. Coase (1937) introduced a fundamentally 
new way to think about the firm.  Coase argued that in the world of neoclassical price 
theory, firms have no reason to exist.  Because we observe firms, he reasoned, there 
must be a “cost to using the price mechanism” (Coase, 1937: 390).  Market exchange en-
tails certain costs:  discovering the relevant prices, negotiating and enforcing contracts, 
and so on.  Within the firm, the entrepreneur may be able to reduce these “transaction 
costs” by coordinating these activities himself.  However, internal organization brings 
other kinds of transaction costs, namely problems of information flow, incentives, moni-
toring, and performance evaluation.  The boundary of the firm, then, is determined by 
the tradeoff, at the margin, between the relative transaction costs of external and inter-
nal exchange.  In a single brief paper, Coase laid out the basic desiderata of the economic 
theory of the firm, namely accounting in a comparative-institutional manner for the al-
location of transactions across alternative governance structures.  Although terminology 
and specific insights may differ, most modern theories of the firm may be said to be 
Coasian in the sense that they adhere to this program.  But what of the entrepreneur in 
Coase’s thought?  
Coase’s position is ambiguous.13 Although he uses the term, his “entrepreneur” 
seems to be more engaged in the mechanical exercise of comparing the costs of organiz-
ing given transactions in given governance structures than in engaging in future-
oriented speculative acts (Boudreaux and Holcombe, 1991).  On the other hand, Coase 
stresses certain aspects of economic organization that are best understood in the context 
of entrepreneurial activities. Notably, his discussion of the employment contract appeals 
to unpredictability and the need for qualitative coordination in a world of uncertainty 
(Langlois and Foss, 1999).  This provides ample room for the entrepreneur as a speculat-
ing and coordinating agent.  However, this potential was not fulfilled, neither in Coase’s 
own thought, nor, as we shall see, in later post-Coasian contribution to the economic 
theory of the firm.   
Modern organizational economics. The post-Coasian theory of the firm — or 
more generally, organizational economics — follows Coase in conceiving the firm as a 
contractual entity whose existence, boundaries, and internal organization can be ex-
plained in terms of economizing on (various types of) transaction costs.  This is not to 
say that any one theory in modern organizational economics has addressed all these 
three key issues in a unified framework incorporating the same kind of transaction costs.  
Indeed, a possible perspective on the division of labor that exists within the modern the-
ory of the firm is that while the principal-agent  approach (Holmström and Milgrom, 
1991) and team theory (Marschak and Radner, 1972) are mainly relevant for understand-
                                                 
13 Coase dismissed Knight’s (1921) explanation. It is arguable that he misunderstood Knight (Foss 1996). 
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ing internal organization, the transaction cost (Williamson, 1985) and property rights 
approaches (Hart, 1995; Hart and Moore, 1990) are designed to explain firm boundaries.  
These approaches have stressed different kinds of transaction costs leading in dif-
ferent ways to contractual imperfection and therefore to economic outcomes inferior to 
the full-information, zero-transaction-cost ideal.  For instance, principal-agent theory 
emphasizes the costs of monitoring contractual relationships in light of potential moral 
hazard.  The property rights approach emphasizes the costs of writing (complete) con-
tracts.  The transaction cost approach also emphasizes contracting costs, but particularly 
the costs of adjusting to unanticipated contingencies.14
Of the four approaches, only the transaction costs approach and the property 
rights approach are conventionally considered theories of the firm in the strict sense.  
Neither team theory nor principal-agent theory explains the boundaries of the firm, de-
fined in terms of asset ownership (Hart, 1995).  Such an explanation must presuppose 
that contracts are incomplete; otherwise, everything can be stipulated contractually and 
there is no need for ownership, the “residual right” to make decisions under conditions 
not specified by contract.  Transaction cost economics and property rights theory, by 
contrast, assume that contracts are incomplete, meaning that some contingencies or out-
comes are not specified in the contract.    
Following Oliver Williamson (1985, 1996), organizational economics has placed 
particular emphasis on specific (or highly complementary) assets in explaining the 
boundaries of the firm.15  Assets are said to be highly specific when their value in the 
present (best) use is much greater than their value in the second-best use.  Investment in 
such assets exposes agents to a potential hazard:  once investments are made and con-
tracts are signed, unanticipated changes in circumstances can give rise to costly renego-
tiation.  One party can threaten to pull out of the arrangement —reducing the value of 
the specific assets — unless that party is allocated a greater share of the quasi-rents of 
joint production.  Fear of being “held up” in this way distorts ex ante investment levels, 
reducing the joint surplus produced by the relationship.  Quasi-rents can be safe-
guarded through vertical integration, where merger eliminates any adversarial inter-
ests.  Less extreme options include long-term contracts, partial ownership, or agree-
ments for both parties to invest in offsetting relationship-specific investments.  Overall, 
several governance structures may be employed.  According to transaction cost theory, 
parties tend to choose the governance structure that best controls the underinvestment 
problem, given the particulars of the relationship.   
In Hart’s (1995) formulation, integration does not eliminate opportunism, but 
rather changes the incentives to engage in opportunism.  By giving property rights to 
the (non-human) specific assets to the party whose ex ante investment most effects the 
                                                 
14 This is a bit of a rational reconstruction on our part: Formal contract theorists, such as principal-agent 
or property right theorists, are uncomfortable with the notion of “transaction cost.”   
15 For expository reasons, we here suppress the differences between Williamson’s and Hart’s versions of 
this story.  
 12
joint surplus, the harmful effects of opportunism can be mitigated.  The key assumption 
in this story is that contracts are left incomplete because (for instance) the transaction 
costs of drafting complete contracts are prohibitive. It is the need to make decisions un-
der circumstances that are not covered by the contract that makes hold-up and its con-
sequences possible. 
Putting entrepreneurship into the modern theory of the firm.  The analytical ap-
paratus of modern organizational economics offers many opportunities for incorporat-
ing concepts of entrepreneurship, particularly the notion of entrepreneurship as judg-
ment.  For example, the emphasis on asset ownership as a crucial aspect of firm organi-
zation accords well with Knight’s (1921) views, as does the emphasis on incomplete 
contracting.  Theories of decision-making under asymmetric information help illustrate 
what is distinctive about entrepreneurship, compared to other kinds of decision-
making.  In many ways, however, the modern economics of organization retains the 
structure of the neoclassical theory of the firm it supplanted.  For example, as capabili-
ties theorists (Langlois and Foss, 1999) have pointed out, the modern economics of or-
ganization has merely grafted a super-structure of asymmetric information, transaction 
costs, and the like on top of the neoclassical theory of production.  Moreover, the mod-
ern economics of organization is almost as deterministic and “closed” as the neoclassi-
cal theory of the firm:  while notions of uncertainty, ignorance, and surprise are occa-
sionally invoked in the literature, they serve merely as rhetorical devices to justify the 
assumption that contracts are incomplete (Foss, 2003). Such notions are not themselves 
explained, nor are they used to incorporate process and entrepreneurship.  Still, key 
insights from organizational economics and the concept of entrepreneurial judgment 
may be usefully joined into a more complete theory of economic organization. 
In the following, we show how the view of entrepreneurship as judgment and 
can be put into organizational economics.  We address the three classical themes of the 
firm’s existence, boundaries, and internal organization.  Consistent with the view that 
entrepreneurship as judgment implies asset ownership, we start with a discussion of 
capital heterogeneity.16
Assets, Attributes, and Entrepreneurship 
The entrepreneur’s primary function is to choose among the various combina-
tions of inputs suitable for producing particular goods (and to decide whether these 
goods should be produced at all), based on current prices for the factors and expected 
future prices of the final goods (Knight, 1921).17  If capital is a single “good,” with one 
                                                 
16 For an attempt to ground this explicitly in Austrian capital theory, see Foss, Foss, Klein, and Klein 
(2002). 
17 This formulation makes it clear that financiers — those who determine how much capital is available to 
each firm and each branch of industry — are also entrepreneurs.  In the traditional, production-function 
theory of the firm, capital markets do little but supply financial capital to managers, who can get as much 
capital as they wish at the going market price. In a more sophisticated understanding, managers do not 
decide how much capital they want; capitalists decide where capital should be allocated. In doing so, 
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price, then entrepreneurship is reduced to choosing between capital-intensive and la-
bor-intensive production methods (or among types of labor).18    Lachmann (1956: 13, 
16), by contrast, stresses that real-world entrepreneurship consists primarily of choosing 
among combinations of heterogeneous capital assets:  
We are living in a world of unexpected change; hence capital combina-
tions . . . will be ever changing, will be dissolved and re-formed.  In this 
activity, we find the real function of the entrepreneur. 
[T]he entrepreneur’s function . . . is to specify and make decisions on the 
concrete form the capital resources shall have.  He specifies and modifies 
the layout of his plant . . . As long as we disregard the heterogeneity of 
capital, the true function of the entrepreneur must also remain hidden.   
In other words, the entrepreneur’s decision problem is complicated by the heterogene-
ity of capital assets.   While it is common to view capital heterogeneity in terms of 
physical heterogeneity — beer barrels and blast furnaces are different because of their 
physical differences — an economic approach emphasizes that capital goods are hetero-
geneous because they have different levels and kinds of valued attributes (in the termi-
nology of Barzel, 1997).  
Attributes. Attributes are characteristics, functions, possible uses of assets, etc., 
as perceived by an entrepreneur.  For example, a copying machine has multiple attrib-
utes because it can be used at different time, by different people, for different types of 
copying work; that it can be purchased in different colors and sizes; and so on.  Clearly, 
virtually all assets have multiple attributes.  Assets are heterogeneous to the extent that 
they have different, and different levels of, valued attributes.  Attributes may also vary 
over time, even for a particular asset.  In a world of “true” uncertainty, entrepreneurs 
are unlikely to know all relevant attributes of all assets when production decisions are 
made.  Nor can the future attributes of an asset, as it is used in production, be forecast 
with certainty.19  Future attributes must be discovered, over time, as assets are used in 
                                                                                                                                                             
they provide essential discipline to the manager, who Mises (1949: 304) calls the entrepreneur’s “junior 
partner” (Klein, 1999). 
18 Moreover, in a world of homogenous capital assets (resources), economic organization would be rela-
tively unimportant.  All capital assets possess the same attributes, and thus the costs of inspecting, meas-
uring, and monitoring the attributes of productive assets is trivial.  Exchange markets for assets would be 
virtually devoid of transaction costs.  A few basic contractual problems — in particular, principal-agent 
conflicts over the supply of labor services — would remain, though workers would all use identical capi-
tal assets.  However, it is hard to see what role ownership of capital assets would play in this world.  If 
the costs of measuring and specifying attributes are low, entrepreneurs and factor owners could contract 
over attributes, and there would be little incentive to acquire ownership of assets themselves. Transac-
tions involving such assets would be governed by complete, contingent contracts. Because contracts 
would substitute for ownership in a homogenous capital world, the boundaries of firms would be inde-
terminate (Hart 1995).  
19   This sense of uncertainty links naturally to the notion of contractual incompleteness.  We explore the 
implications of this idea below.  
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production. Or, to formulate the problem slightly differently, future attributes are cre-
ated as entrepreneurs envision new ways of using assets to produce goods. 
Ownership and entrepreneurship.  Focusing on attributes not only helps to illus-
trate the concept of heterogeneous capital, but also illuminates the vast literature on 
property rights and ownership.  Barzel (1997) stresses that property rights are held over 
attributes, and property rights to known attributes are the relevant units of analysis in 
his work.  In contrast, he dismisses the notion of asset ownership as essentially legal 
and extra-economic.  Similarly, Demsetz argues that the notion of “full private owner-
ship” over assets is “vague,” and “must always remain so” because “there is an infinity 
of potential rights of actions that can be owned . . . It is impossible to describe the com-
plete set of rights that are potentially ownable” (Demsetz 1988: 19).   
 However, as we noted above, most assets have unspecified, not-yet-created or 
not-yet-discovered attributes, and an important function of entrepreneurship is to cre-
ate or discover them.  Contrary to Demsetz, it is exactly this feature that creates a dis-
tinct role for asset ownership — that is, for acquiring legal title to a bundle of existing 
attributes as well as to future attributes.  Specifically, ownership is a low-cost means of 
allocating the rights to attributes of assets that are created or discovered by the entre-
preneur-owner.  For instance, those who create or discover new knowledge have an in-
centive to use it directly because it is costly to transfer knowledge to others.   In a well-
functioning legal system, ownership of an asset normally implies that the courts will 
not interfere when an entrepreneur-owner captures the value of newly created or dis-
covered attributes of an asset he owns.  Consequently, the entrepreneur-owner can usu-
ally avoid costly negotiation with those who are affected his creation or discovery.  This 
keeps the dissipation of value at bay.  Of course, asset ownership itself provides a pow-
erful incentive to create or discover new attributes, as ownership conveys the legally 
recognized (and at least partly enforced) right to the income of an asset, including the 
right to income from new attributes.20  We next apply these ideas to the three classical 
issues in the theory of the firm: existence, boundaries, and internal organization.  
The Existence of the Firm 
 Incomplete markets for judgment.  Agents may realize rents from their human 
capital through three means:  (1) selling labor services on market conditions, (2) entering 
into employment contracts, or (3) starting a firm.  As Barzel (1987) argues, moral hazard 
implies that options (1) and (2) are often inefficient means of realizing rents.  In other 
words, entrepreneurs know themselves to be good risks but are unable to communicate 
this to the market.  For this reason, firms may emerge because the person whose services 
are the most difficult to measure (and therefore are most susceptible to moral hazard and 
                                                 
20  Moreover, ownership simplifies the process of entrepreneurial arbitrage (Kirzner, 1973)—and hence 
helps to close pockets of ignorance in the market—by allowing entrepreneurs to acquire, in one transac-
tion, a bundle of rights to attributes (i.e., a distinct asset). This means that the parties need not engage in 
costly bargaining over many rights to single attributes. The dissipation of value is thus minimized. 
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adverse selection) becomes an entrepreneur, employing and supervising other agents, and 
committing capital of his own to the venture, thus contributing a bond.  
However, there are other reasons why the market may not be able to evaluate en-
trepreneurial services.  For example, Kirzner (1979: 181) argues that “entrepreneurship 
reveals to the market what the market did not realize was available, or indeed, needed at 
all.”  Casson (1982: 14) takes a more Schumpeterian position, arguing that “[t]he entrepre-
neur believes he is right, while everyone else is wrong.  Thus the essence of entrepreneur-
ship is being different — being different because one has a different perception of the situa-
tion” (see also Casson 1997).  In this situation, non-contractibility arises because “[t]he de-
cisive factors . . . are so largely on the inside of the person making the decision that the 
‘instances’ are not amenable to objective description and external control” (Knight 1921:  
251) (see also Foss 1993).  Hence moral hazard is not the only important factor underlying 
non-contractibility.  An agent may be unable to communicate his “vision” of a commercial 
experiment — a specific way of combining heterogeneous capital assets to serve future 
consumer wants — in such a way that other agents can assess its economic implications.  In 
such a case, he cannot be an employee, but will instead start his own firm.  The existence 
of the firm can thus be explained by a specific category of transaction costs, namely, those 
that close the market for entrepreneurial judgment.  
Firms as controlled experiments.  The idea of incomplete markets for judgment 
helps us understand the one-person firm.  However, similar ideas may also be useful for 
understanding the multi-person firm; that is, it may help us understand the emergence of 
the employment contract.  
Consider again the notion of capital (resource) heterogeneity.  If capital is ho-
mogenous, the coordination of plans is relatively straightforward.  In the real world of 
heterogeneous capital assets, production plans are much more difficult to coordinate.  
In the “production function view” of the firm, this problem is sidestepped by assuming 
that the assets controlled by the firm are already in their best uses.  More realistically, 
however, full ex ante knowledge about the optimal sequence of tasks (for example) is 
not likely to exist.21  Given that the relationships among assets are generally unknown 
ex ante, some experimentation is necessary.  First, one must isolate the system bounda-
ries, that is, where the relevant relationships among assets are most likely to be.  Sec-
ond, the experimental process must be like a controlled experiment (or a sequence of 
such experiments) to isolate the system from outside disturbances.  Third, there must be 
some sort of guidance for the experiment.  This may take many forms, ranging from 
centrally provided instructions to negotiated agreements to shared understandings of 
where to begin experimenting, how to avoid overlapping experiments, how to revise 
the experiment in light of past results, and so on.  The central problem is how this ex-
perimental process is best organized.  Does the need for experimentation explain the 
                                                 
21 Strikingly, the problem of defining an optimal sequence of tasks in even relatively simple production 
systems may require more calculation capacity than is available in a supercomputer (Galloway 1996). 
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existence of the firm, or can such experimentation be organized efficiently through 
markets?  
In a world of complete knowledge and zero transaction costs, all rights to all uses 
of all assets could be specified in contracts.  By contrast, in a world of heterogeneous 
assets with attributes that are costly to measure and partly unforeseen, complete con-
tracts cannot be drafted.  The resulting set of incomplete contracts may constitute a 
firm, a process of coordination managed by the entrepreneur’s central direction.  If rela-
tionship-specific assets are involved, the holdup problem described above becomes a 
serious concern.  (Asset specificity may itself be an outcome of an experimental proc-
ess.)  More specifically, as experimental activity provides information about how to op-
timize the system, assets will be increasingly specific in terms of time and location.  
Temporal and site specificity will tend to increase as assets become more efficiently co-
ordinated.  This provides one rationale for organizing the experiments inside firms, 
though not the only one.  Firms may also be justified by problems associated with the 
dispersion of knowledge across agents.  Production systems may exhibit multiple equi-
libria, and it may not be obvious how to coordinate on a particular equilibrium or even 
which equilibria are preferred.   
In principle, an experimenting team could hire an outside consultant who guides 
the experimental activity, giving advice on the sequence of actions and asset uses, initi-
ating the experiments, drawing the appropriate conclusions from each experiment, de-
termining how these conclusions should influence further experimentation, and so on.  
However, such an arrangement is likely to run into serious bargaining costs.  Under 
market contracting any team member can veto the advice provided by the consultant, 
and submitting to authority may be the least costly way to organize the experimental 
activity.  “Authority” here means that the entrepreneur has the right to redefine and 
reallocate decision rights among team members and to sanction team members who do 
not use their decision rights efficiently.  By possessing these rights, entrepreneur-
managers can conduct experiments without continuously having to renegotiate con-
tracts, saving bargaining and drafting costs.  Such an arrangement then provides a set-
ting for carrying out “controlled” experiments in which the entrepreneur-manager 
changes only some aspects of the relevant tasks to trace the effects of specific rear-
rangements of rights.  Establishing these property rights is tantamount to forming a 
firm.     
Changes in Firm Boundaries and Entrepreneurial Experimentation 
The theory of firm boundaries is closely related to the theory of entrepreneur-
ship, though it is not usually expressed in this fashion.  Mergers, acquisitions, divesti-
tures, and other reorganizations are best viewed as responses to a valuation discrep-
ancy.  Acquisition, for example, occurs when the value of an existing firm’s assets is 
greater to an outside party than to its current owners.  Put differently, merger can be a 
response to economies of scope, in that the value of the merging firms’ assets combined 
exceeds their joint values separately.  
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New combinations of corporate assets can generate efficiencies by replacing 
poorly performing managers, creating operating synergies, or establishing internal capi-
tal markets.  Like other business practices that do not conform to textbook models of 
competition, mergers, acquisitions, and financial restructurings have long been viewed 
with suspicion by some commentators and regulatory authorities.  However, the aca-
demic literature clearly suggests that corporate restructurings do, on average, create 
value (Jarrell, Brickley, and Netter 1988; Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford 2001).  Given 
such benefits, why are many mergers later “reversed” in a divestiture, spin-off, or 
carve-out?  Klein and Klein (2001) distinguish between two basic views.  The first, 
which may be termed empire building, holds that entrenched managers make acquisi-
tions primarily to increase their own power, prestige or control, producing negligible 
efficiency gains, and that acquisitions by manager-controlled firms are likely to be di-
vested ex post.  Most important, because the acquiring firm’s motives are suspect, such 
acquisitions are ex ante inefficient; neutral observers can predict, based on pre-merger 
characteristics, that these mergers are unlikely to be viable over time.  (Moreover, by 
permitting these acquisitions, capital-market participants are also guilty of systematic 
error.)  
A second view, which Klein and Klein (2001) term entrepreneurial market process, 
acknowledges that unprofitable acquisitions may be “mistakes” ex post, but argues that 
poor long-term performance does not indicate ex ante inefficiency.  In the market-
process perspective, a divestiture of previously acquired assets may mean simply that 
profit-seeking entrepreneurs have updated their forecasts of future conditions or oth-
erwise learned from experience.  As Mises (1949: 252) puts it, “the outcome of action is 
always uncertain. Action is always speculation.”  Consequently, “the real entrepreneur 
is a speculator, a man eager to utilize his opinion about the future structure of the mar-
ket for business operations promising profits. This specific anticipative understanding 
of the conditions of the uncertain future defies any rules and systematization” (p. 585, 
emphasis added).  
Klein and Klein (2001) discuss empirical evidence that the long-term success or 
failure of corporate acquisitions cannot, in general, be predicted by measures of man-
ager control or principal-agent problems.  However, significantly higher rates of dives-
titure tend to follow mergers that occur in a cluster of mergers in the same industry.  As 
argued by Mitchell and Mulherin (1996), Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford (2001), and 
Andrade and Stafford (2004), mergers frequently occur in industry clusters, suggesting 
that mergers are driven in part by industry-specific factors, such as regulatory shocks.  
When an industry is regulated, deregulated, or re-regulated, economic calculation be-
comes more difficult, and entrepreneurial activity is hampered.  It should not be sur-
prising that poor long-term performance is more likely under those conditions. 
This notion of entrepreneurial decision-making under uncertainty squares with 
recent theories of acquisitions as a form of experimentation (Mosakowski 1997; Boot, 
Milbourn, and Thakor 1999; Matsusaka, 2001).  In these models, profit-seeking entre-
preneurs can learn their own capabilities only by trying various combinations of activi-
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ties, which could include diversifying into new industries. Firms may thus make diver-
sifying acquisitions even if they know these acquisitions are likely to be reversed in a 
divestiture.  This process generates information that is useful for revising entrepreneu-
rial plans, and thus an acquisition strategy may be successful even if individual acquisi-
tions are not.  In these cases, the long-term viability of an acquisition may be systemati-
cally related to publicly observable, pre-merger characteristics associated with experi-
mentation, but not characteristics associated with managerial discretion. 
Internal Organization   
Productive and destructive entrepreneurship.  In much of the entrepreneurship 
literature, there is a general, though usually implicit claim that all entrepreneurial activ-
ity is socially beneficial (Mises 1949; Kirzner 1973).  However, as Baumol (1990) and 
Holcombe (2002) point out, entrepreneurship may be socially harmful if it takes the 
form of rent-seeking, attempting to influence governments (or management) to redis-
tribute income but in the process consuming resources and bringing about a social loss.  
It is therefore necessary to introduce a distinction between productive and destructive 
entrepreneurship.   
When agents expend effort discovering new attributes and taking control over 
these in such a way that joint surplus (net social benefit) is reduced, we shall speak of 
“destructive entrepreneurship.” Thus, discovering new forms of moral hazard (Holm-
ström 1982), creating hold-ups (Williamson 1996), and inventing new ways of engaging 
in rent-seeking activities relative to government (Baumol 1990, Holcombe 2002) are ex-
amples of destructive entrepreneurship in the sense that these represent the discovery 
of new attributes that decrease joint surplus.  “Productive entrepreneurship” refers to 
the creation or discovery of new attributes leading to an increase in joint surplus.  For 
example, a franchisee may discover new local tastes that in turn may form the basis for 
new products for the entire chain; an employee may figure out better uses of production 
assets and communicate this to the TQM team of which he is a member; a CEO may 
formulate a new business concept; etc.  In the following we sketch how this distinction 
provides a way of developing an entrepreneurial approach to internal organization.  
Note that we here use the term “entrepreneurship” more broadly than before, referring 
not only to decisions made by resource owners (entrepreneurship in the strict sense), 
but also to decisions made by employees, acting as proxy decision-makers for the re-
source owners. 
Fundamental tradeoffs in internal organization. The first such problem concerns 
the control of destructive entrepreneurial activities.  For example, firms may delimit 
employees’ use of telephone and internet services by closely specifying their use rights 
over the relevant assets, instructing them to act in a proper manner towards customers 
and to exercise care when operating the firm’s equipment, and the like.  However, firms 
are unlikely to succeed entirely in their attempt to curb such activities.  One reason for 
this is the costs of monitoring employees.  Another reason is that employees may crea-
tively circumvent constraints; for example, they may invent ways of covering their 
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(mis-)use of the internet. Although firms may know that such destructive entrepreneur-
ship takes place, they may prefer not to try to constrain it further.  This is because the 
various constraints that firms impose on employees (or, more generally, that contract-
ing partners impose on each other) to curb destructive entrepreneurship may have the 
unwanted side effect that productive entrepreneurship is stifled (see Kirzner, 1985).  
More generally, imposing (too many) constraints on employees may reduce their 
propensity to create or discover new attributes of productive assets.  At any rate, many 
firms increasingly appear to operate on the presumption that beneficial effects may be 
produced by reducing constraints on employees in various dimensions. For example, 
firms such as 3M allocate time to research employees that they are basically free to use 
in almost any way they see fit in the hope that this will produce serendipitous discover-
ies.  Many consulting firms do something similar.  Of course, industrial firms have long 
known that employees with many decision rights — researchers, for example — must 
be must be monitored and constrained in different, and typically much looser, ways 
than those employees charged only with routine tasks.  More broadly, the increasing 
emphasis on “empowerment” during the last few decades reflects a realization that 
employees derive a benefit from controlling aspects of their job situation.  Moreover, 
the total quality movement emphasizes that delegating various rights to employees mo-
tivates them to find new ways to increase the mean and reduce the variance of quality 
(Jensen and Wruck, 1994).  To the extent that such activities increase joint surplus, they 
represent productive entrepreneurship. 
Stimulating the productive creation and discovery of new attributes by relaxing 
constraints on employees results in principal-agent relationships that are less com-
pletely specified.   This is not simply a matter of delegation, or transferring specific de-
cision rights, but rather giving agents opportunities to exercise their own, often far 
reaching, judgments.  However, as we have seen, this also permits potentially destruc-
tive entrepreneurship.  Managing the tradeoff between productive and destructive en-
trepreneurship thus becomes a critical management task.    
Choosing efficient tradeoffs.  In this context, asset ownership is important be-
cause it gives entrepreneurs the right to define contractual constraints, that is, to choose 
their own preferred tradeoffs.  Briefly stated, ownership allows the employer-
entrepreneur’s preferred degree of contractual incompleteness — and therefore a certain 
combination of productive and destructive entrepreneurship — to be implemented at 
low cost.  This function of ownership is particularly important in a dynamic market 
process, the kind stressed by Knight (in the later chapters of Knight, 1921) and the Aus-
trians (Hayek, 1948; Kirzner, 1973; Littlechild 1986).  In such a context, an ongoing proc-
ess of judgmental decision making requires contractual constraints to address the 
changing tradeoffs between productive and destructive entrepreneurship inside the 
firm. The power conferred by ownership allows the employer-entrepreneur to do this at 
low cost (for a fuller analysis, see Foss and Foss, 2002).   
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Conclusion 
The theory of entrepreneurship and the economic theory of the firm thus have much to 
learn from each other.  A good theory of entrepreneurship should explain the condi-
tions under which entrepreneurship takes place:  Does the entrepreneur need a firm?  
We have argued that the concept of entrepreneurship as judgment provides the clearest 
link between entrepreneurship, asset ownership, and economic organization.  Similarly, 
the economic theory of the firm can be improved substantially by taking seriously the 
essential heterogeneity of capital goods and the subsequent need for entrepreneurial 
experimentation. 
Will these insights be incorporated into the economic theory of the firm?  We are 
optimistic, but guardedly so.  Because these concepts lie fundamentally outside the 
standard constrained optimization framework, they are inherently difficult to model 
mathematically.  Modern economists have difficulty appreciating ideas that are not ex-
pressed in this familiar language.  Indeed, most recent theoretical advances in the eco-
nomic theory of the firm have been developed within the more formal framework asso-
ciated with Grossman, Hart, and Moore, not the more “open” framework associated 
with Williamson.22  Relaxing this constraint may lead to considerable advances in 
economists’ understanding of the firm. 
                                                 
22 Bajeri and Tadelis (2001) is a prominent exception.  See Foss (1994) for the case that Williamson’s work 
represents an ontologically “open” interpretation of Coase, distinguished in this way from other devel-
opments of the Coasian tradition. 
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